Background: Whether hospitals with the highest riskstandardized readmission rates (RSRRs) subsequently experienced the greatest improvement after passage of the Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) is unknown.
based on their previous performance. Performance was assessed on the basis of readmission rates within 30 days after hospitalizations for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), congestive heart failure (CHF), and pneumonia. These metrics were publicly reported on Medicare's Hospital Compare Web site starting on 9 July 2009 (3) and applied to reimbursements starting on 1 October 2012 (2) . Performance during a period starting in 2009 and extending after passage of the law was the basis for the penalties administered in 2012 ( Figure 1 ).
This program represents one of several efforts to encourage provider organizations to enhance safety and value. Medicare has reported lower readmission rates since passage of the law (4, 5) , but whether the lowest-performing hospitals might experience less rapid improvement than hospitals that are already performing well, due to being underresourced or serving vulnerable populations, has been questioned (6) .
In the context of this uncertainty, we analyzed timeseries data on all-cause and condition-specific 30-day risk-standardized readmission rates (RSRRs) for Medicare fee-for-service enrollees from 2000 to 2013 to answer 2 questions. First, we sought to confirm that hospital RSRRs for AMI, CHF, and pneumonia decreased after passage of the ACA compared with any preexisting trends in improvement before passage of the law. Second, we determined whether the acceleration of improvement in readmission rates after passage of the law was greater in the lowest-performing hospitals than in higher-performing hospitals.
after hospitalization for AMI, CHF, or pneumonia from 1 January 2000 through 30 November 2013. Hospitalizations for AMI, CHF, or pneumonia were defined as a principal discharge diagnosis of an International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification code for those conditions. These codes are used for public reporting and financial penalties (7, 8) . We restricted the sample to patients who were enrolled in the fee-for-service plan for at least 12 months before an index hospitalization and continued enrollment in the plan for at least 1 month after the index discharge.
Patient Characteristics and Comorbidities
Patient demographic information included age; sex; and major comorbidities, including 7 cardiovascular history variables and 14 variables representing other comorbidities. Clinical variables were obtained from secondary diagnosis codes in the index conditionspecific hospitalization as well as from principal and secondary diagnosis codes from all hospitalizations for 12 months before the index hospitalization. These comorbidities were classified using the Hierarchical Condition Categories method (9) . Inpatient claims from 1999 were used to obtain comorbidities for patients hospitalized in 2000.
Hospital Characteristics and Penalty Information
Hospital characteristics included teaching status (teaching vs. nonteaching); Joint Commission certification (yes/no); hospital geographic location (urban vs. rural); ownership (public or private not-for-profit); number of beds; mean age of Medicare fee-for-service admitted patients; percentage of admitted patients who were white, black, and female; median hospital volume; 30-day mortality and readmission rates; and percentage of admissions for dual-eligible patients (those eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid).
We obtained publicly available hospital penalty information (2) . The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) combined the hospital-specific diagnosis-related group payments and hospitalspecific excess readmission ratios for AMI, CHF, and pneumonia to determine penalties (2) . In fiscal year 2013, the maximum penalty was 1% of total Medicare payments. We used penalties for fiscal year 2013, the first year of the penalties. For this analysis, we divided hospitals into 4 groups based on the size of the penalty: highest-performing (0% penalty), averageperforming (>0% and <0.50%), low-performing (≥0.50% and <0.99%), and lowest-performing (≥0.99%). We excluded hospitals not in the CMS HRRP penalty list; many of these hospitals were small and were acquired by other hospitals during our study period (10) . Only hospitals that existed during the entire period were included in this analysis.
Outcomes
The primary outcomes were hospital-specific, 30-day, all-cause RSRRs for patients discharged with AMI, CHF, or pneumonia. All-cause readmissions were defined as 1 or more hospitalizations in any acute care hospital in the United States for any cause within 30 days of discharge from an index hospitalization. For the index hospitalization, patients transferred from 1 acute care hospital to another were considered to have 1 episode of care, attributed to the last hospital in the transfer chain. To permit complete 30-day follow-up, we used December 2013 inpatient data to obtain readmission information for patients discharged in November 2013.
Using the CMS risk-standardized method for profiling hospitals (7, 8, 11) , for each hospital in each quarter, we estimated 30-day all-cause RSRRs after hospitalizations for AMI, CHF, or pneumonia. Briefly, we fitted a hierarchical generalized linear model with a logit link function and hospital-specific random intercepts to model 30-day all-cause readmissions as a function of patients' age, sex, and comorbidities described previously. This model accounts for patient case mix and permits hospital-level random intercepts. We also calculated a combined RSRR that reflected readmissions after hospitalizations for any of the 3 conditions.
Definition of the Intervention Point
The ACA was signed into law on 23 March 2010, but because readmissions are categorized by quarter, we considered the end of the first quarter of 2010 (31 March) as the time point of intervention. We chose the actual enactment of the ACA-a law that included the HRRP-as the time point of intervention rather than the start of financial penalties for 2 reasons. First, at the time the law was passed, hospitals became aware of impending penalties and began implementing admin- 
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istrative changes, including redesigns of care processes, in anticipation of the penalties. Second, because readmission rates at the time of passage of the law would influence future penalties, hospitals were incentivized to reduce readmissions starting in 2010 ( Figure 1 ). Although we made our decision before we examined the data, visual inspection of the data confirmed an inflection point in readmission rates occurring at the time the law was passed. To assess the effect of the law's passage, we defined a prelaw period of 40 quarters before passage of the law (1 January 2000 to 31 March 2010) and a postlaw period of 15 quarters after passage of the law (1 April 2010 to 31 December 2013). The span of the prelaw period was also varied in a sensitivity analysis (see Sensitivity Analysis section).
Statistical Analysis
In the main analysis, we used a 2-stage approach to test the following 2 hypotheses: 1) hospital-specific RSRRs have improved over time in the postlaw period, after control for any prelaw preexisting secular trends in each of the 4 performance groups; and 2) any increase in the rate of reduction in hospital RSRRs (postlaw vs. prelaw period) was greater for hospitals with lower performance than for those with higher performance.
Specifically, at the first stage of the hierarchical model, we specified and fitted a logistic regression to patient-level data to estimate the RSRRs for each quarter. At the second stage, we specified and fitted a piecewise linear model with a change point placed at the time of passage of the ACA (the intervention point, between the prelaw and postlaw periods), with the estimated RSRRs from the first stage as the dependent variable ("trend model"). The equation is defined mathematically and represented visually in the Supplement (available at Annals.org). For the trend models, we used generalized estimating equations with robust SEs and an autoregressive correlation structure. Unless otherwise specified, we report both the absolute proportion of readmitted patients and the rate of change in the RSRRs over time as the number of readmissions per 10 000 discharges per year.
Sensitivity Analysis
The piecewise model described earlier was fitted to the estimated RSRRs, ignoring that RSRRs may be more or less precise depending on hospital volume. Therefore, in a sensitivity analysis, we refitted our piecewise model weighted by hospital volume for each disease condition. We also adjusted for hospital characteristics in the piecewise linear models to control for hospital differences among performance categories. In a third sensitivity analysis, we performed the original statistical analysis using 15 quarters as the prelaw period, as opposed to the 40-quarter prelaw period used in the primary analysis. To assess whether our findings were sensitive to the performance group definitions, we repeated the analyses after recategorizing the performance categories into equally sized quartiles. We re- Hospitals not on the penalty list and those that did not exist during the entire study period were excluded. 
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Role of the Funding Source
The National Institutes of Health and the Hassenfeld Scholars Program of the Cardiology Division at Massachusetts General Hospital had no role in the design, conduct, or analysis of this study or the decision to submit the manuscript for publication.
RESULTS
In this analysis, 2868 hospitals met inclusion criteria (Figure 2, top) . In the first year of HRRP penalties (fiscal year 2013 [1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013]), 866 of the 2868 hospitals (30.1%) were assigned to the highest-performance group, 1261 (44.0%) were assigned to the average-performance group, 483 (16.8%) were assigned to the low-performance group, and 258 (9.0%) were assigned to the lowest-performance group. Characteristics of the hospitals are shown in Table 1 , and the distribution of hospitals nationally by performance group is shown in the Supplement. Among the included hospitals, 15 170 008 patients were discharged alive, of whom 3 380 151 (22.9%) were readmitted within 30 days (Figure 2, bottom) .
Compared with the highest-performing hospitals, those with the lowest performance served a greater percentage of black patients (13.1% vs. 7.3%; P < 0.001), female patients (56.7% vs. 53.1%; P < 0.001), and dual-eligible patients (26.1% vs. 17.0%; P < 0.001). They also had higher all-cause readmission rates after hospitalization for any condition (17.2% vs. 13.3%; P < 0.001); were more likely to be a major teaching hospital (11.2% vs. 6.1%; P < 0.001); were less likely to be a private, not-for-profit hospital (61.6% vs. 70.6%; P < 0.001); and were less likely to be in a rural setting (22.9% vs. 29.9%; P < 0.001).
Readmission Trends
Overall, risk-standardized readmissions increased by an estimated 0.5 (95% CI, 0.3 to 0.7) per 10 000 discharges per year before passage of the law and decreased by 76.6 (CI, 76.1 to 77.1) per 10 000 discharges per year after passage of the law. These trends differed for hospitals in different performance groups (Figure 3) . During the prelaw period, we found that risk-standardized readmissions for combined conditions decreased by 1.4 (CI, 1.1 to 1.7) per 10 000 discharges per year in the highest-performance group, remained stable in the average-performance group (increase of 0.2 [CI, Ϫ0.02 to 0.5] per 10 000 discharges per year), increased by 2.3 (CI, 1.8 to 2.8) per 10 000 discharges per year in the low-performance group, and increased by 2.6 (CI, 1.8 to 3.5) per 10 000 discharges per year in the lowest-performance group ( Table 2) Table 2) . After controlling for prelaw trends, we found that an additional 67.6 (CI, 66.6 to 68.4), 74.8 (CI, 74.0 to 75.4), 85.4 (CI, 84.0 to 86.8), and 95.1 (CI, 92.6 to 97.5) readmissions per 10 000 discharges were averted per year, respectively ( Table 2 ). The number of readmissions averted was larger among lowerperformance groups than higher-performance groups ( Table 2) .
For AMI, risk-standardized readmissions decreased by 23.7 (CI, 23.5 to 24.0) per 10 000 discharges per year before passage of the law and by 99.3 (CI, 98.6 to 100.1) per 10 000 discharges per year after passage of the law. For CHF, risk-standardized readmissions increased by 5.1 (CI, 4.8 to 5.3) per 10 000 discharges per year before passage of the law and decreased by 84.7 (CI, 83.9 to 85.4) per 10 000 discharges per year after passage of the law. For pneumonia, riskstandardized readmissions increased by 3.1 (CI, 2.9 to 3.4) per 10 000 discharges per year before passage of For all 3 conditions, the number of averted readmissions was larger among lower-performance groups than higher-performance groups ( Table 2) . For AMI, after controlling for prelaw trends, we found that an additional 65.6 (CI, 63.6 to 67.2), 74.1 (CI, 72.8 to 75.2), 83.2 (CI, 80.8 to 85.2), and 93.3 (CI, 89.6 to 97.2) readmissions per 10 000 discharges were averted per year in the highest-, average-, low-, and lowest-performance groups, respectively. For CHF, the corresponding numbers were 77.6 (CI, 76.4 to 79.2), 86.8 (CI, 85.6 to 88.0), 100.8 (CI, 98.4 to 102.8), and 112.0 (CI, 108.0 to 115.6) readmissions per 10 000 discharges, respectively. For pneumonia, the corresponding numbers were 46.0 (CI, 44.8 to 47.2), 50.4 (CI, 49.6 to 51.2), 56.4 (CI, 54.4 to 58.0), and 62.8 (CI, 60.0 to 66.0) readmissions per 10 000 discharges, respectively (Supplement).
Sensitivity Analysis
Our results were robust when we accounted for hospital volume, other hospital characteristics, the categorization of performance for hospitals, substitution of observed readmissions for risk-standardized readmissions, and the selection of the prelaw period (15 vs. 40 quarters before passage of the law). Our results were also similar in the full hierarchical model. Results of all sensitivity analyses are presented in the Supplement.
DISCUSSION
In this analysis, we confirmed that readmission rates after hospitalizations for AMI, CHF, and pneumonia and for all 3 conditions combined improved nationally with the passage of the HRRP as part of the ACA in March 2010. Furthermore, we showed that lowperforming hospitals had more accelerated improvement than hospitals with better performance, suggesting that the law led to a reduction in discrepancies in performance on this metric. Readmission rates for the lowest-performing hospitals were increasing before the law. Nevertheless, after passage of the law, the rate of decrease in RSRRs for penalized conditions was onethird greater than that of the highest-performing hospitals. Taken together, our main findings suggest that passage of the law was followed by widespread reductions in readmission rates, even with control for prelaw trends, and that this effect was most concentrated among the lowest-performing hospitals.
These findings are important because they suggest that implementation of the HRRP achieved its goal of accelerating reductions in hospital readmissions, particularly for the lowest-performing institutions. Because the financial penalties are applied to up to 3% of all inpatient revenue for each hospital, the magnitude of the reductions in readmissions shown here is likely to have had substantial financial implications for individual hospitals. For patients with heart failure at the lowestperforming hospitals, the readmission rate decreased from 26.5% in 2010 to 23.3% in 2013, a relative decrease of nearly one sixth over just 3 years.
These findings also contribute to a general understanding of how policies motivate health care providers to improve performance. Evidence that financial incentives improve the quality of care is mixed (12) (13) (14) (15) . In this case, Medicare began publicly reporting readmission metrics in 2009 on the Hospital Compare Web site (16) , and providers would not have known that financial penalties would be tied to these metrics until passage of the bill. When passage of the law confirmed that these penalties would be forthcoming, provider organizations improved readmission rates over and above the preexisting trend. These findings suggest that coupling performance metrics to financial incentives may have more substantial effects on performance than public reporting alone.
Furthermore, a concerning potential outcome of the new policy was that low-performing hospitals might not be able to improve due to poor financial circumstances or insufficient infrastructure. At least in the Readmission Rates After Passage of Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program ORIGINAL RESEARCH initial phase, the magnitude of improvement in the lowest-performing hospitals was actually greater than in the higher-performing hospitals. Others have shown that HRRP penalties were applied disproportionately to hospitals that serve black patients and patients with lower levels of education and household income (17) (18) (19) (20) . Our results are consistent with those findings, although here we also tested for differences in longitudinal trends in readmission rates and acceleration of improvement across different performance groups. The fact that lower-performing hospitals accelerated improvement more than higher-performing hospitals is likely multifactorial. First, lower-performing hospitals have more room for improvement. As such, our results may have been a form of "regression to the mean." Even so, our results present strong evidence that passage of the law caused this change in hospital performance patterns. Second, because lowerperforming hospitals are more likely to serve socially and economically disadvantaged patients, we could not distinguish between general improvement in lowerperforming hospitals and improvement in the care of these specific patient groups in all hospitals. Distinguishing among the reasons that lower-performing hospitals achieved more accelerated improvement will be essential to sustaining improvement and reducing disparities in care between hospitals.
A key strength of our analysis is that our statistical approach minimized potential threats to validity that are common in the analysis of policy interventions, particularly confounding bias (history bias). This can occur when events that take place before or during the intervention have a greater effect than the intervention itself. To control for this source of potential bias, our statistical approach implemented a pre-post analysis, with the prelaw period serving as a control for the postlaw period. Although this approach is useful for longitudinal analysis of the health effects of policy changes, it should be recognized that there is no natural control group that was unaffected by the policy intervention (21-24).
Our analysis should be interpreted in the context of important limitations. First, because this was an analysis of claims data, our results are subject to discrepancies due to inaccuracies of billing codes. Nevertheless, our methods to detect specific diagnoses are identical to the methods used by CMS to assess financial penalties. In addition, accuracy in the claims data is unlikely to have varied dramatically before and after passage of the law in a way that would explain our findings. Second, we cannot be certain that decreases in readmission rates were due to genuine improvements in quality, particularly in other domains. Third, we do not know whether these improved quality metrics will continue. These questions will be essential to examine in the future. Fourth, as a study of inpatient readmissions, this analysis could not detect the extent to which hospitals may have decreased inpatient readmissions by increasing observation readmissions (25) . Fifth, we did not model comorbidities as having potential time dependence in their effect on readmissions, which may have affected our results. Finally, although we demonstrated that lower-performing hospitals showed the most accelerated improvement in readmission rates, our analysis cannot distinguish between improvement caused by the magnitude of the penalty and improvement caused by changes in health status in different patient populations. Nevertheless, a sensitivity analysis that adjusted for patient and hospital characteristics did not alter our main findings.
In conclusion, improvement in RSRRs after AMI, CHF, and pneumonia accelerated after passage of the law. Compared with hospitals with the highest initial performance, those with the lowest performance had greater acceleration in the rate of improvement for all 3 conditions. From Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts.
